A very public debate: the nuclear industry in Port
Hope
by Bart Hawkins Kreps*
There probably aren’t many small towns where the daily newspaper’s
letters page is regularly filled with discussions of the oxidization
potential of freshly-reduced UO2, or the caloric consequences of
an unplanned criticality.
But for the past two years, debates on nuclear issues have dominated
not only local newspaper content, but also discussions in the municipal
council chamber, in Port Hope, Ontario.
Just over two years ago a new group, Families Against Radiation Exposure
(FARE) distributed a flyer entitled “Enriched Uranium? Enriched
Risk”. A year later, FARE claimed a victory when Cameco dropped
its plan to blend Slightly Enriched Uranium in Port Hope. But in the
months since, FARE’s campaign against local nuclear facilities
has only intensified. And among the citizens of Port Hope, it is widely
believed that FARE’s goal is to rid the town of any active
nuclear industry.
A brief background
Cameco’s Port Hope facility was part of a crown corporation
for most of its 70-year history. In the early years, unwanted byproducts
were dumped in many locations around the community. In the 1970s,
the
federal government recognized that these practices should not have
been allowed, and took responsibility for the clean-up. Low-level
radioactive waste has been consolidated in a small number of fenced-off
locations.
The transport of this material to a state-of-the-art storage site
is slated to begin in 2008.
The actual health effects of this history are open to debate. Two
Health Canada studies found no overall increase in cancer in Port
Hope as
compared to other Ontario towns. But the call for more in-depth health
studies has been persistent.
Some citizens have campaigned against the nuclear industry for decades,
and make no bones about their deep distrust of nuclear business interests
and regulatory personnel. By contrast, many citizens regard Cameco
and fuel-bundle manufacturer Zircatec as good employers, community
philanthropists, and industries which now operate with the highest
standards of environmental protection.
In 2004, the phrase “Slightly Enriched Uranium” brought
the divisions into sharp relief.
What does FARE stand for?
Is FARE an anti-nuclear group? In my view, FARE walks like an anti-nuclear
group and talks like an anti-nuclear group. But the group’s leaders vigorously
deny that the group is anti-nuclear, and I believe that’s a major factor
in their success.
Certainly, some of FARE’s most active members make no secret of their anti-nuclear
views. For one of FARE’s first public meetings, in June 2004, the featured
speaker was long-time anti-nuclear activist Gordon Edwards. The first FARE newsletter
featured a large-type statement by US anti-nuclear environmentalist Robert F.
Kennedy Jr.: “Port Hope has been called upon to make itself the national
sacrifice zone for Canada.”
FARE’s official goal – “to end radioactive pollution in Port
Hope” – sounds more sensible than its name, Families Against Radiation
Exposure, given that there is radiation exposure everywhere on earth and throughout
history. But an implied equivalence between “radioactive exposure” and “radioactive
pollution” serves FARE’s purposes very well.
FARE president John Miller has a long and illustrious career in journalism,
and he currently teaches journalism at Ryerson
University.** He knows how to plow
through stacks of documents in search of a quotable phrase. In discussing
the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation reports, Mr. Miller cited
the statement that “a
preponderance of scientific evidence shows that even low doses of ionizing
radiation are likely to pose some risk of adverse health effects.”
He then offered his own translation: “Essentially, the report said
there is no safe level of radiation exposure.”1 Would Miller therefore
conclude that common household smoke detectors, and dental X-rays, are
unsafe? He has
declined to answer such questions, which FARE supporters often dismiss
as distractions from the “real” issue – the inherent
danger of any radiation from a nuclear installation.
FARE’s reaction to a study by Jacques Whitford Ltd. was a prime example
of selective reading. The town council had contracted Jacques Whitford to review
Cameco’s Environmental Assessment for the SEU project. The executive summary
of the review stated: “Jacques Whitford concurs with the conclusions that
the results of the assessment identified no significant residual environmental
effects of the proposed SEU Blending Project, including effects from accidents
and malfunctions, effects of the environment on the Project, and cumulative environmental
effects.” The report also mentioned a few areas where Cameco’s
EA report should be strengthened.
FARE’s response was to run a newsletter article headlined “Municipal
peer review finds fault with Cameco.” The article said that “FARE
supports many findings in a municipal peer review report which says that Cameco’s
draft Environmental Assessment contains serious deficiencies.” The peer
review’s major conclusion was not mentioned.
Terror alert in Port Hope
Slightly Enriched Uranium is more radioactive than natural uranium. If one
believes no level of radioactivity is safe, then a marginal increase in radioactivity,
in a substance that’s only slightly radioactive to begin with, may be seen
as highly important. However, the possible connection of “enriched” with
weapons has received even more attention.
The FARE website says that “because of its potential use in a nuclear bomb
programme, enriched uranium is a greater security risk than natural uranium.” It
also says that an “unplanned chain reaction is called a ‘criticality
accident’. Such an accident is simply not possible with natural (un-enriched)
uranium.”
Furthermore, the site states that “The heat energy released by … a ‘criticality’ is
sufficient to vaporize metals…. The advanced fuels mentioned above (from
SEU to MOX) can suffer criticality accidents if they come in contact with water.”
Cameco representatives, and a number of other writers, pointed out in detail
why the above statements were far-fetched. The points made include: 1) SEU
would be useless to a terrorist group wishing to build a bomb, since they would
need
an immense industrial apparatus to enrich the material the final 90% of the
way to weapons-grade; 2) far from “vaporizing metal”, the one criticality
accident involving uranium enriched to less than 7% released about 1000 BTU
of heat; 3) although an accident involving 19% enriched material killed two
plant
workers, there has yet to be recorded harm to members of the outside public
from any criticality accident.
Nevertheless, the risk of terrorism is cited frequently, particularly by Port
Hope councillor John Morand, one of FARE’s founders. Mr. Morand chairs
the town’s Protection to Persons and Property committee. He is not shy
about citing his previous high-rank positions, including a recent stint as
CEO of the Toronto Port Authority. He says that his experience makes him qualified
to comment on security issues, and his speeches to regulatory officials sometimes
include pointed references to possible lawsuits.
At least twice, Morand has referred to the Cameco plant, in writing, as potentially “the
world’s largest dirty bomb.” But given the great difficulty of creating
an effective “dirty bomb” even with highly radioactive materials,
it is not plausible to create one with the minimally radioactive materials
processed at Cameco.
Morand has also cited the danger of a criticality at Zircatec’s Port Hope
plant, where SEU is slated to be assembled into fuel bundles. In his brief
to the CNSC in February 2005, Morand said: “A small criticality at 5 per cent
is a sphere of 35 kilograms, which would be about the size of a beach ball ….
A small criticality at 1 per cent would be somewhere between 1,200 and 1,500
kilograms ….”
Morand posed this scenario: “So if you had an individual with a bit of
a problem, there is the possibility in a power failure to move with that 35
kilograms of material from one area to the other and drop it into a drain or
toilet. Then
you have a moderator.”
In response, Zircatec president Lloyd Jones pointed out: “when you are
talking about, for example, 1 per cent material, which is the bulk of material
that would be used in this future line ... that is about 1,700 kilograms, which
is about the size of a car, weight of a car. It is very difficult to lug that
size and volume of material into a washroom and find a sink or toilet large
enough to put it in to make it go critical while at the same time holding it
in a spherical
shape in order to have the ideal condition for a criticality to take place.”
The CNSC staff at the hearing accepted Mr. Jones’ explanation. But given
FARE’s open distrust of the CNSC, we can expect to hear some variant of
the “criticality in the loo” scenario again.
A
burning issue … or at least, an oxidizing issue
Starting in the summer of 2005, FARE issued frequent statements claiming that
the CNSC was negligent, because they had stated that Cameco’s fire protection
provisions were “unacceptable”, and yet Cameco had been given extensions
in correcting the alleged deficiencies. Mr. Miller accused the CNSC of “reckless
disregard for safety”. But when this writer asked Mr. Miller to clarify
what he thought Cameco should be required to do, or what posed such an immediate
and pressing fire danger at Cameco, Mr. Miller openly declined to answer.
In the following months, many people, including fire-fighters, wrote that emergency
preparations in Port Hope were quite adequate.
But in spite of the conflicting opinions, to Mr. Miller the issue was clear-cut.
In March of 2006, he wrote in the Port Hope Evening Guide that “Quite simply,
if a fire broke out tomorrow at Cameco or Zircatec involving radioactive or hazardous
materials, nobody in the community could put it out. We’d have to wait
for trained firefighters and equipment to arrive from Toronto. We know this because
the municipality’s fire chief has said so.”
In the same letter, he praised the recently appointed fire chief with
the words “Frank
Haylow is about the only public figure standing up for accuracy and
common sense ….” 2
Such talk was too much for some long-serving firefighters to bear.
A recently decorated volunteer, Bob Cranley, wrote a letter disputing
the claims of FARE
and of the new fire chief. And the former fire chief, who had served
in that position for 19 years, also voiced his confidence in emergency
preparations. 3
Matters quickly came to a boil. Mr. Cranley was dismissed from the force, there
was an outpouring of public support for Mr. Cranley, Mr. Cranley was re-instated – and
FARE bore the brunt of the public anger, though there was no evidence of a FARE
role in Mr. Cranley’s dismissal.
Meanwhile, Mr. Miller continued to question the flammability of uranium.
Over several months, various writers had explained that uranium dioxide
does not
burn in the sense of going up in flames, but that under certain conditions
it will
spontaneously oxidize, get warm, and then cool down. The explainers
included Zircatec president Lloyd Jones, and a number of long-time
Cameco employees.
But to Mr. Miller, it seemed, the chemical complexities were unacceptable – he
wanted a simple yes-or-no answer. In a letter to the editor, he fumed: “The
truly alarming thing is that nobody at the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission seems to know or care who’s right about the rather
basic question of whether or not uranium can be set on fire.” 4
Twenty-eight year Cameco veteran Glen MacKenzie made another effort to clear
the air: he cited the Material Safety Data Sheet on UO2. He noted that “the
MSDS states that UO2 is not flammable.” In response Mr. Miller claimed
that FARE had finally discovered the truth about UO2:: “Rather than taking
Mr. MacKenzie’s word for it, I have obtained the MSDS sheets that he refers
to, dated May 2001. They say that ‘freshly reduced UO2 powder is pyrophoric
and will react with the oxygen in air and burn.’”
In fact, the two-page MSDS states explicitly that UO2 is
not flammable, and that its flammability rating is O. Furthermore,
in the sentence about reacting
with
oxygen, there are quotation marks around the word “burn” – quotation
marks which Mr. Miller’s letter omitted. The MSDS is perfectly
consistent with the explanations offered by Mr. MacKenzie and others.
But in Mr. Miller’s
reading, the MSDS was the smoking gun, which uncovered the “misinformation
put forward by people who should know better.” 5
Not In My Front Yard
After all this, can FARE be termed an anti-nuclear group? Not in their view.
A number of FARE spokespeople, including Mr. Miller, Mr. Morand, and board
member George Clements, have stated that they are personally pro-nuclear. From
the beginning,
FARE has cast its net as widely as possible to gain support, and then focussed
only on one very limited, but very strategic, goal at a time.
In the early days of the anti-SEU campaign, the specific strategic goal was
to get a full panel review of the project, instead of the Environmental Assessment
process. In those months, Mr. Miller would sometimes say he didn’t have
enough information to be for or against the SEU project; the important thing
was to have full scrutiny, which only a Panel Review could provide. FARE also
minimized the time frame, and the costs to taxpayers, of such a process.
When Cameco announced they would buy SEU elsewhere, FARE was quick
to claim credit for a victory. And some members openly celebrated
the first step in
getting the
nuclear industry out of town. But FARE waited until the summer of
2006 to launch an open campaign around the issue of SEU processing
at Zircatec. And as late
as August 2006, an angry Mr. Miller answered a newspaper editorial
by writing, “you
twist words in an attempt to prove that FARE really wants Cameco
to leave town. For the record, we have not called for that because
we do not feel we have
the facts to justify such a move. There are too many unanswered questions.”6
Asking questions: in FARE’s autobiography, asking questions is the group’s
defining characteristic. Its printed logo is a large question mark – albeit
a question mark drawn as an ugly distorted ink blot, which makes a pretty definite
emotional statement. In the anti-SEU campaign, FARE effectively choked the
project with questions, 623 of them to be precise. Although many of the questions
had
only a tenuous relationship to the SEU proposal, and there were readily available
answers for many of the others, FARE insisted that all 623 questions must be
answered.
Port Hope’s unique circumstances made that strategy very effective. For
many reasons, the local soil is fertile ground for fear, uncertainty and doubt.
First, widespread contamination in decades past has left ambiguous results.
FARE explicitly ties the issue of licenses for Cameco’s and Zircatec’s
present-day activities to lingering worries about the past. The latest FARE newsletter
states as the first current goal: “Stop any new production of enriched
uranium until Port Hope residents get convincing proof that 70 years of exposure
to radiation has not been harmful to their health.” It’s virtually
inconceivable that all FARE members could ever be “convinced” of
such a thing. On the flip side, even if it were proven convincingly that someone
had been harmed due to the practices of decades ago, would that constitute
logical grounds for shutting down vastly different activities today?
FARE argues that other nuclear facilities, such as large-scale nuclear reactors,
typically have at least 1,000 meter buffer zones, whereas the Cameco and Zircatec
facilities are built in the heart of a small town. It’s quite a stretch
to compare the processing of natural uranium, or even SEU, to a nuclear fission
operation or an enrichment plant. But “we are the buffer zone” is
a favourite FARE phrase.
FARE also highlights public uncertainty on the issue of “natural versus
artificial” radiation. If there is evidence that radiation from a processed
and inhaled uranium particle is more dangerous than an equivalent dosage from
perfectly natural inhaled radon, I have not seen it. But FARE members argue
that the fine particles of uranium dust that still escape the HEPA filters
at Cameco
constitute a qualitatively unique health threat.
Finally, there is the unaesthetic set of industrial buildings filling what
might be an attractive small-town harbour. Even among those who feel that Cameco’s
activities pose no danger, there are those who would much rather see a non-industrial
zoning. In their view, it would be a good thing if Cameco’s facility
were replaced with marinas, restaurants, and perhaps a mix of office space
and condos.
And FARE has questioned whether Cameco might be an economic burden, in spite
of the taxes and employment dollars.
And so far, just raising questions has been its most effective tool. The clear
lesson of the SEU battle so far has been that FARE doesn’t have to prove
anything. By getting a sufficient number of its questions onto the regulatory
agenda, FARE made the SEU blending proposal uneconomical. That strategy doesn’t
appear to have changed for round two: FARE’s current goal is to extend
the licensing process, so that Zircatec will be required to submit a full Environmental
Assessment in order to process 1% enriched uranium.
Cameco Corp., which completed its acquisition of Zircatec in February, has
expanded an already extensive public consultation programme. Several forums
have been
held this year, each one bringing together scores of Port Hope residents. The
discussions have sometimes been heated, but the company is continuing with
forums that are projected to include a wide variety of industry experts and
critics.
FARE takes credit for “forcing” the company to consult with the
community. On the other hand, FARE members including Mr. Miller have openly
worried that
by participating in the consultations, they are being co-opted by a corporate
public relations campaign.
One can only hope that in the future, Port Hope’s nuclear debate will
generate as much light as it generates heat.
- - - - - - - - - -
**Correction: the original version
of this article stated that Mr. Miller is head of the newspaper journalism
department at Ryerson. This was outdated information; Mr. Miller has
not been head of the newspaper journalism department for several years.
Correction posted 26 Feb 2007. return
to text
Notes
*Bart
Hawkins Kreps moved to Port Hope in 2004
and has been active in public discussions about Cameco and FARE.
He has never worked in any branch of the nuclear industry. return
to text
1 Port Hope Evening
Guide, page 4, May 31, 2006 return
to text
2 Port Hope Evening
Guide, March 2, 2006 return
to text
3 Port
Hope Evening Guide, March 29, 2006, letter by Jim Boughen, who
had been Chief of the Port Hope Fire Department for 19 years return
to text
4 Port
Hope Evening Guide, March 2, 2006 return
to text
5 Port Hope Evening
Guide, April 17, 2006. This letter, and the MSDS itself, remain
posted on
FARE’s website as of this writing, and are highlighted on the
site’s opening page, www.ph-fare.com return
to text
6 Port
Hope Evening Guide, August 21, 2006 return
to text
